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A B S T R A C T
This article is a characterization of the cyber insurance market in Sweden. As empirical in-
vestigations of cyber insurance are rarely reported in the literature, the results are novel.
The investigation is based on semi-structured interviews with 10 insurance companies active
on the Swedish market, and additional interviews with 2 re-insurance companies and 3 in-
surance intermediaries. These informants represent essentially all companies selling cyber
insurance on the Swedish market. Findings include descriptions of the coverages offered,
including discrepancies between insurers, and the underwriting process used. Typical annual
premiums are found to be in the span of some 5–10 kSEK per MSEK indemnity limit, i.e.
0.5–1% of the indemnity limit. For business interruption coverage, waiting periods are found
to be relatively long compared to many outages. Furthermore, insurance companies impose
information and IT security requirements on their customers, and do not insure custom-
ers that are too immature or have too poor security. Thus cyber insurance, in practice, is
not merely an instrument of risk transfer, but also contains aspects of avoidance and miti-
gation. Based on the findings, market segmentation, pricing, business continuity, and
asymmetry of information are discussed, and some future work is suggested.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Modern society is becoming increasingly dependent on IT ser-
vices. Functioning IT services now underpin aspects of all
human endeavors, from work to leisure, from private to public
sector, and from Andorra to Zanzibar. When these services stop
functioning, whether by non-malicious mistakes or by mali-
cious attacks, consequences are immediately felt and effects
ripple through interconnected IT service orchestrations, inte-
grated supply chains, and interdependent businesses processes
across the globe. In this sense, IT services are becoming a criti-
cal infrastructure, much like roads, electricity, tap water, and
financial services.
As a result, there is much research dedicated to prevent-
ing IT outages and ensuring business continuity. Whereas in
the early years of computing hardware outages were the main
culprit behind downtime, since the 1980s, IT administration
and software errors have become predominant causes of
outages (Gray, 1990) along with human errors (Pertet and
Narasimhan, 2005). With the advent of service oriented and
cloud computing, much effort has gone into the investiga-
tion of how to optimize quality of service in these settings
(Casalicchio et al., 2013), including how to learn from past in-
cidents in order to offer better future services (Kieninger et al.,
2013). From a traditional reliability engineering perspective, risk
management of IT outages have been endowed with studies
of statistical distributions of IT outages and the importance
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of knowing them (Franke et al., 2014; Snow and Weckman, 2007;
Snow et al., 2010). To prevent or mitigate malicious attacks, re-
search is constantly ongoing in areas like intrusion detection
systems (Liao et al., 2013), threat detection (Virvilis and Gritzalis,
2013), and cyber security in industrial control systems (Knapp
and Langill, 2014).
However, with the realization that all threats, security
breaches and IT outages cannot be prevented by technical
means alone, financial risk management through so called cyber
insurance has become an increasingly discussed comple-
ment. Its relevance has been further increased by the trends
of outsourcing and cloud computing: whenever IT is not op-
erated in-house, it is difficult to manage risk through technical
or organizational measures, further underscoring the role of
making financial risk management. This has traditionally been
solved by requiring external IT service providers to maintain
an errors and omissions insurance. However, many large service
providers have strict service level agreements (SLA) that limit
their liability. Therefore, cyber insurance is often used to cover
the gap between the insurance coverage and contract limita-
tions of the service provider and the full loss of the client.
This growing interest in cyber insurance is reflected in many
ways. IT strategy consultancies like Gartner provide guide-
lines for how to use it effectively (Wheeler et al., 2015). Insurance
industry forecasts predict expected growth in premiums from
around 2 billion USD in 2015 to some 20 billion USD or more
by 2025 (Wells and Jones, 2016). International organizations like
the EU (ENISA, 2016) and the OECD (OECD, 2016) are conduct-
ing studies aiming to better understand the potential of cyber
insurance. National governments like the British are support-
ing the growth of the cyber insurance market to improve cyber
security risk management (Cabinet Office, 2014).
It is against this background that the research reported in
this article was conducted. Its focus is the cyber insurance
market in Sweden. This may seem like a provincial concern,
but there are reasons why this is interesting beyond Swedish
borders as well. First, most of insurance companies active on
the Swedish market are global companies. Even though their
products are adapted to local markets, they are also bound to
have much in common across the globe. Second, Sweden regu-
larly scores top results when countries are evaluated in terms
of digital and ICT maturity. For example, Sweden was ranked
3rd in the World Economic Forum’s Networked Readiness Index
2016 (World Economic Forum, 2016), 3rd in the EU Digital
Economy & Society Index 2017 (European Commission, 2017),
and 3rd in the International Telecommunication Union’s ICT
Development Index 2013 (ITU, 2014). It is reasonable to assume
that the cyber insurance experience of mature countries such
as Sweden might offer valuable and relevant insights for other
countries as well. Third, the findings include results concern-
ing pricing and premiums that are unique in the literature and
thus merit attention in this respect.
The general research question addressed in this article is:
What does the cyber insurance market in Sweden look like?
This broad question is broken down into a few more specific
research questions:
• What coverage do typical cyber insurance products offer?
• How many cyber customers and claims do insurance com-
panies have?
• How is the market segmented?
• How does the underwriting process look?
• How are premiums determined?
• Are business interruptions treated with mathematical avail-
ability modeling tools?
• How does cyber insurance fit into a bigger risk manage-
ment tool box?
These research questions were investigated using semi-
structured interviews with the insurance companies offering
cyber insurance products on the Swedish market. At this stage,
no demand side investigation, i.e. data collection from buyers
of cyber insurance, was conducted. Nevertheless, the find-
ings offer an interesting picture of the cyber insurance market
in Sweden.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section
2 reviews the literature for related work.The methodology used
is described in Section 3, followed by a report of findings in
Section 4. Results and implications are then discussed in Section
5, which together with the findings is the main contribution.
Section 6 concludes the article with some final remarks and
thoughts on future work.
2. Related work
The concept of cyber insurance has received much academic
attention over the past decade and a half. From a conceptual
point of view, insurance is an interesting approach to prob-
lems of IT security, as it allows risk management of low-
probability–high-impact events by sharing the risks over many
actors, each of whom individually would be severely affected
by an event, but who collectively can afford to save enough to
cope with it. It is also possible for insurance companies to
impose mandatory requirements on their customers, thus im-
proving security for everyone. However, there is a large difficulty:
cyber risks are not independent, the way they are in many other
lines of insurance (Böhme and Kataria, 2006). First, a non-
malicious outage or a malicious attack can suddenly affect
“everyone” using a certain kind of technology, whether this is
a shared data center or a software with a newly discovered vul-
nerability. Second, both the business continuity and the
information security of any one actor are highly dependent on
the efforts of other actors with whom the first actor somehow
interacts. Anderson and Moore, in a review article published
in Science over a decade ago, concluded that these difficulties,
unfortunately, have hampered both the development and use
of cyber insurance products (Anderson and Moore, 2006).
These difficulties are mirrored in the negative results that
pervade the literature: cyber insurance markets cannot exist
when the cyber risks facing individual clients are too corre-
lated (Böhme and Kataria, 2006) or when insurers cannot
observe their customers’ security levels (Shetty et al., 2010) and
furthermore, policies tend to be overpriced because insurers
are unable to anticipate customers’ secondary losses such as
reputational damage (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2009). Other models
give more encouraging results: cyber insurance can create pow-
erful incentives to invest in security (Bolot and Lelarge, 2009),
partial cyber insurance coverage can motivate non-cooperative
insurance customers to invest more efficiently in self-defense
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(Pal and Golubchik, 2010), and cyber insurance premiums can
be estimated in robust ways (Herath and Herath, 2011). Böhme
and Schwartz offer a good but now slightly dated literature
review, and also introduce a framework to make sense of all
the different models and assumptions found in the literature
(Böhme and Schwartz, 2010).
Concluding their literature review, Böhme and Schwartz note
an oddity of cyber insurance research: while economic re-
search on insurance is typically concerned with the existing
products and markets, the study of cyber insurance has been
more concerned with developing theoretical models than with
empirical research (Böhme and Schwartz, 2010). Therefore, it
is encouraging that some empirical work has been published
in recent years. For example, Biener et al. use data on cyber-
related losses from an operational risk database to empirically
analyze whether these losses are insurable, according to stan-
dard criteria (Biener et al., 2015).Though they identify difficulties
known from the literature – (i) correlation between losses, (ii)
lack of data, and (iii) severe information asymmetries – the
authors nevertheless conclude on a positive note, observing
that growing and developing markets will offer important op-
portunities for improvement, including better data collection.
The newer literature also includes various empirical studies
of data breaches (Edwards et al., 2015; Sinanaj and Muntermann,
2013) relevant not least in pricing cyber insurance.
A more recent comprehensive literature review of cyber in-
surance was compiled in late 2016 by Eling and Schnell, available
both as a condensed academic journal article (Eling and Schnell,
2016b) and as an extended working paper including supple-
mental material, available from the Geneva Association (Eling
and Schnell, 2016a). It is organized along seven core topics, the
last of which is what the cyber insurance market looks like and
what the main insurability challenges are. To summarize their
main findings about the cyber insurance market, it is still small
but expected to grow significantly in the next years, and the
US is far ahead of Europe.
Despite some progress in recent years, Eling and Schnell also
conclude that more empirical research is needed, both on the
demand and the supply sides. This is a key motivation for the
research reported in the present article. By making an empiri-
cal characterization of the cyber insurance market in Sweden
today, a contribution is made to the state of knowledge about
actual market practices, complementing the theoretical un-
derstanding abundantly found in the literature.
Two existing pieces in the literature are particularly closely
related to the present article: First, a short monograph about
the cyber insurance market in Germany, written by a free-
lance journalist commissioned by an insurance company
(Choudhry, 2014). It is similar in its systematic approach to
analyze a particular market, but obviously different in which
market that is, as well as in being more of a popular science
work. Second, a recent study on cyber insurance by European
Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA,
2016). While this study is more policy-oriented, making rec-
ommendations to policy makers, insurance companies, and
customers, it also has some empirical contents based on ques-
tions posed to a cyber insurance stakeholders group including
representatives from cyber insurance companies.There is some
overlap in scope, e.g. the underwriting process and the cov-
erage offered, but the present article differs both in its
systematic approach to analyze the market in a single country,
and more importantly, in reporting novel results on pricing and
premiums.
3. Method
In order to answer the research questions about the Swedish
cyber insurance market, it was decided to approach the supply
side, i.e. the insurance companies, first. To do so, the industry
association Insurance Sweden was first contacted. Insurance
Sweden works to promote good business conditions for the in-
surance industry, and also maintains publicly available statistics
about the Swedish insurance industry. However, as it turned
out, Insurance Sweden does not collect any statistics on cyber
insurance. Nevertheless, Insurance Sweden did provide contact
details to a number of relevant actors on the Swedish insur-
ance market who were known to be working in the cyber area.
3.1. Interview questions
In preparation for the interviews with the insurance compa-
nies, interview questions were developed. It was decided to
conduct semi-structured interviews with a mix of open ques-
tions that would allow the informant to comment and expand
on the subject more freely, and more specific questions that
would require more precise answers. The questions, some-
what compressed for conciseness, were as follows:
• Do you offer insurance against IT incidents? This could be
cyber insurance, or it could be other kinds of insurance, e.g.
business interruption insurance that covers outages in IT
services. If so, expand on what is covered, e.g. in terms of
data theft, data manipulation and business interruption.
• How big is the market and your market share? For example,
how many customers do you have for the cyber insurance
product? What is the turnover of a typical customer?
• How many cyber claims do you have?
• Can you reveal anything about your pricing? For example,
is the pricing based on historical claims data, other kinds
of data, or some kind of best guess? Can you say anything
about premiums and indemnity limits?
• Is pricing affected by the particular situation and matu-
rity of customers? Do you use particular methods to assess
customers, e.g. ITIL, IT audits etc.? Do you work proactively
with customers to increase security?
• If you cover business interruption, do you do any model-
ing in terms of Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) and Mean Time
to Restore (MTTR) for customer IT services?
This set of questions was initially developed based on the
research questions. In order to get second opinions on the ap-
plicability and relevance of the questions, they were also
subjected to review by two experts. The first expert was a col-
league of the author with a PhD in mathematics and several
years of professional experience as an actuary in the insur-
ance business. The second expert was a representative from
Insurance Sweden. Based on their comments and sugges-
tions, the questions were refined and revised. One particular
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concern was how much “hard data” the insurance compa-
nies would be willing to reveal about the market and their
pricing. Therefore, an important insight from this review phase
was the need to clearly communicate to the informants that
their anonymity would be preserved, that they would have the
opportunity to review the results before publications, and that
the research effort is impartial in relation to the competing com-
panies on the market.
3.2. Data collection
Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with
market actors in the period of September to November 2016.
The primary informants were representatives from 10 insur-
ance companies active on the Swedish market. Out of these,
5 were on the original contact list provided by Insurance
Sweden, and the other 5 were recruited through additional con-
tacts made in the interview phase. These 10 are anonymously
referred to as Insurance company 1–10 (or I1–I10 for short) in
the following. Whereas Insurance companies 1–9 offer dedi-
cated cyber insurance products, Insurance company 10 does
not. Still, the interview with I10 plays an important role in pro-
viding a contrasting perspective, and I10 was deliberately
included precisely for this reason. I2, I3, I4, I5, I6, I7, and I9 are
global companies. I1, I8, and I10 are regional actors on the Nordic
and Swedish markets.
Additionally, interviews were conducted with 2 re-insurance
companies (RE1-2 for short) and 3 insurance intermediaries
(II1-3 for short). These interviews with secondary informants
were conducted following recommendations from other in-
formants, or from Insurance Sweden.The rationale for including
these interviews in the investigation was to collect addi-
tional perspectives from market actors that do not sell cyber
insurance directly, but nevertheless are knowledgeable in the
area, and more impartial regarding the offers of particular in-
surance companies. While these interviews also focused on the
research questions and were loosely based on the questions
listed in Section 3.1, they should be regarded as unstruc-
tured, rather than semi-structured, interviews carried out to
collect background data and contrasting perspectives.
All interviews were carried out face to face in Scandina-
via, most often at an office of the insurance company. Most
interviews were conducted in Swedish or in Swedish and mu-
tually understandable Scandinavian languages, but two
interviews were conducted in English. At 8 of the primary in-
formant companies, a single representative was interviewed,
while 2 primary informant companies elected to have two rep-
resentatives present at the interview. All interviews were
conducted by the author. In two cases (I5 and I6), the author
was accompanied by a colleague. A typical interview lasted for
about one hour. In addition to the answers given in the inter-
view, I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, and I6 all provided additional materials
ranging from marketing flyers to example policy schedules.
3.3. Verification of interview results
Following each of the 10 interviews with primary infor-
mants, interview notes of 1–2 regular pages of written text were
sent to the company representative(s) interviewed. Addition-
ally, preliminary versions of Table 1 below were distributed for
review. The representatives were requested to review the notes
and the table for accuracy and also to identify any informa-
tion that they would like to have removed or made less precise
in order to preserve informant anonymity. It was explained that
the notes distributed were “raw” notes and as such verbose,
whereas the final text, as reflected mostly in Sections 4–5, would
be more condensed. All 10 primary informants gave relevant
feedback on the interview notes and the table, thus ensuring
that the documentation of the interviews reflects the beliefs
of the informants.
Once all interviews had been conducted, and a prelimi-
nary analysis of the data was ready, all primary and secondary
informants were invited to a seminar held in late November
2016, where the findings were presented and the informants
were given the opportunity to comment and reflect upon them.
While not all informants participated, the seminar was at-
tended by some ten informant representatives, and the
discussions at the seminar served as additional verification of
the results, as well as further informing the analysis detailed
in Section 5.
As a final measure to verify the results, a draft of this article
was sent to all primary and secondary informants in Febru-
ary 2017, giving them the opportunity both to correct factual
errors and to offer reflections on the analysis. All informants
responded, most often just a confirmation that results were
accurate, but also some corrections to factual details and rel-
evant reflections.
4. Results
In the following subsections, the main results are presented.
A summary of findings is given in Table 1. Implications are
further analyzed in Section 5.
4.1. Coverage
Originally, the term “cyber insurance” – sometimes “cyber li-
ability insurance” – comes from the US, and the corresponding
product focuses on the 3rd party liabilities connected with data
and privacy breaches, including notification costs. This empha-
sis is due to breach notification laws, enacted in most US states,
that mandate companies subject to data breaches to notify cus-
tomers and other parties about the breach, and to take
measures to limit the damage caused to such 3rd parties. His-
torically, this differs from Europe, where the 1st party costs of
business interruption have instead been in focus. This discrep-
ancy, however, has been decreasing in the past few years, and
the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is
widely expected to make liabilities connected with data and
privacy breaches a top concern in Europe.
As a result of this convergence, all the dedicated cyber in-
surance products investigated (i.e. the products of Insurance
companies 1–9) offer coverage of both 1st party costs and 3rd
party liabilities. A typical cyber insurance product on the
Swedish market covers 1st party costs such as lost revenue from
business interruption, cost of cyber extortion (though actu-
ally paying a ransom is only a very last resort), costs for forensic
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investigations and system restoration, as well as legal and PR
costs related to cyber incidents. Products also cover 3rd party
liabilities resulting from e.g. data and privacy breaches (in-
cluding notification costs), malware spread from the insured,
fines (if legal to insure by law), costs to comply with investi-
gations and regulatory requirements, and internet or cyber
media liabilities (e.g. copyright infringements, libel, etc.).
At the coarse level of detail described above, all the cyber
insurance products investigated are similar in their offer-
ings. However, there are also key discrepancy areas, which can
be very important to customers. This is interesting, as lack of
clarity on coverage in cyber insurance has been identified as
a reason for its limited adoption (ENISA, 2012).
The first important discrepancy is whether non-malicious
events (e.g. mistakes, omissions) are covered at all, and if so,
which such events are covered (e.g. power outages). Here, com-
panies have different policies. Some are very strict in not
covering non-malicious events at all. I5, for example, de-
scribes such coverage as opening a potential Pandora’s box,
where it is difficult to know what kind of risk is accepted. This
also conforms to I5’s overall strategy, which is to offer a con-
servative “standard” cyber insurance product that does not differ
much from competitors. Others offer optional coverage. I4, for
example, does not include 1st party errors in the standard
package, but offers coverage for errors or omissions commit-
ted by the insured as an add-on for an extra fee. I6, similarly,
covers (i) attacks only in the standard coverage, but sells sepa-
rate extensions also covering to (ii) human errors, (iii) technical
failures, and also (iv) legal or regulatory requirements (e.g. when
the police orders a system to remain shut down for the sake
of a crime scene investigation). I7 also offers business inter-
ruption protection in three versions: (i) business interruption
costs due to security events (attacks), (ii) costs due to attacks
and system failures not due to attacks (any unplanned, unin-
tended interruption is covered), both of which are triggered by
the interruption, and (iii) additional protection against the
effects of reputational harm triggered by data loss. Some offer
coverage of non-malicious events as part of the standard
package, for example I2, I8 and I9, but do not cover power
outages or other physical damage that is outside of the insured
party’s control and that is typically covered by property in-
surance. These exceptions apply to the market in general –
physical damage or bodily injuries caused by cyber incidents
are not covered by cyber insurance. I8, however, remarks that
there is scope for future product development where an add-
on product covering physical damage from cyber events would
be sold. The insurance intermediaries paint a similar picture.
II1 and II2 both report that there is an ongoing development
toward increased coverage of non-malicious events, but that
current offerings differ in exactly what is covered.
A second discrepancy concerns the extent to which events
at sub-contractors or external service providers are covered.
Clearly, in the age of outsourcing and cloud computing, these
differences can be very important to the insured. Again, in-
surance companies take different approaches. I6, for example,
offers to cover outages at external service providers either
unnamed (with an increase in the premium of some 20–25%
and the indemnity limit cut in half) or a specific list of some
3–5 named providers. Others, such as I7 and I8, make no dis-
tinction between internal outages and outages at external
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service providers. Indeed, I7 believes that most companies are
actually better off, from a business interruption perspective,
trusting providers like Microsoft, Google, or Amazon rather than
trying to build equally reliable in-house IT environments.These
big service providers, however, typically have terms and con-
ditions where they do not accept responsibility for business
interruptions caused by service outages, meaning that it is
prudent for their customers to buy insurance coverage instead.
A third discrepancy, pointed out by II3, relates to the cov-
erage offered for subsidiaries and corporate entities in different
jurisdictions. For example, I3, I5, and I6 all automatically cover
new subsidiaries created during the policy period, subject to
some exceptions regarding size, line of business, and jurisdic-
tions. However, their exceptions differ. For example, I3 allows
a new subsidiary to have assets worth up to 20% of the total
assets of the insured (parent company and all subsidiaries to-
gether), I5 sets the same limit to 25%, and I6 instead imposes
a limit at 10% of the total turnover. Similarly, exclusions on ju-
risdictions vary. I3 covers wrongful acts committed and claims
made anywhere in the world, but excludes claims and regu-
latory proceedings brought or originating in the US and Canada.
I5 per default imposes territorial and claim jurisdiction limits
that exclude the US and Canada. I6 per default covers losses
incurred and claims made in the entire world.
A final observation regarding coverage relates to the divi-
sion of labor between cyber insurance on the one hand and
traditional property and liability insurance on the other hand.
For example, I1, which does not cover non-malicious events
in its cyber insurance, remarked that a cyber business inter-
ruption caused by non-malicious outages might still be covered
by a traditional business interruption insurance, though this
would not be explicitly clear from the policies. Then again, as
remarked by I2, a traditional business interruption insurance
might not cover a cyber business interruption. I8 remarked that
they might have undesired coverage of cyber business inter-
ruption in their non-cyber portfolio, i.e. traditional business
interruption insurance where cyber incidents are not explic-
itly excluded, and a customer thus reasonably could make a
claim. If in such a case an agreement cannot be reached, the
interpretation of the policy would have to be settled in court.
I1, I2, and I8 all agreed that this situation is undesirable, and
that it is mostly due to old policies written for stand-alone ma-
chinery (e.g. a business interruption insurance designed to cover
losses resulting from outages in manufacturing machines) not
having been updated to reflect today’s realities (e.g. inte-
grated supply chains, Industry 4.0, and industrial Internet of
Things). From the re-insurance perspective, RE2 also re-
marked that uncertainty about what is covered in existing
policies also can have a profound effect on re-insurance com-
panies, exposing them to large and unexpected losses.
The question of how much coverage for cyber events is in-
cluded in traditional insurance was at the heart of the interview
with I10, which does not offer any pure cyber insurance product
today. I10 identified two products in their portfolio that might
cover cyber events: (i) a computer breach clause in the crime
insurance policy (a liability insurance designed to cover finan-
cial losses caused by employee dishonesty), and (ii) the business
interruption insurance essentially designed to cover fire, flood-
ing, and machinery breakdown. According to I10, the computer
breach clause in the crime insurance policy would probably be
difficult for the insured to use, as the insured has the burden
of proof that a breach has occurred, and as there is a sweep-
ing exception for “computer viruses”, making the policy difficult
to interpret unambiguously. As for the business interruption
insurance, I10 largely agrees with the comments from I1, I2,
and I8, that policies are not as clear and explicit as would be
desirable. Interruptions without physical damage are explic-
itly excluded, disqualifying many cyber incidents, but not all.
For example, a Stuxnet like incident where a production fa-
cility is hacked and machinery is run outside specifications until
it breaks would not be excluded by the physical damage cri-
terion, since physical damage indisputably occurred. To
summarize, I10 finds itself in a position where it has
unquantified and uncertain exposure to cyber risk in tradi-
tional non-cyber insurance products. In the long run, this is
not desirable. However, the exposure remains largely poten-
tial, as of now, since the representatives of I10 did not know
of any cyber-related claims under either of the two relevant
policies. I10, being an insurance company with mostly small
and medium sized customers, many of whom traditionally have
not been very dependent on information technology, reports
that it and its European peers are a bit hesitant about devel-
opment of cyber products.
The ambiguity of coverage – customers might think that
cyber incidents are covered, the insurer thinks they are not –
is familiar from the literature (Eling and Schnell, 2016b).
4.2. Incident first response services
An essentialist view of cyber insurance might be that it is only
a product where a policyholder pays a premium to receive fi-
nancial compensation in case of certain IT related adverse
events. However, the investigated cyber insurance products are
not pure financial risk transfer instruments in this sense. Rather,
all informants affirm the importance of first response inci-
dent management as an integrated part of their products and
an important sales driver. As pointed out by II1, these ser-
vices also give insurance companies a degree of control of the
quality of incident management, making it easier to predict
and manage the costs of incidents.
This service typically takes the form of a one-stop-shop in-
cident telephone service which the insured calls when an
incident occurs. The insurance companies do not provide this
service in-house, but rather partner with IT consultancies, law
firms, PR consultants etc. who deliver the actual first re-
sponse services. Typically, the first response is coordinated by
a law firm or a dedicated claims management firm, that calls
upon other consultancies as needed.
The exception to this rule is I6, which at the time of the
interview did not offer this kind of all-consultancy-costs-
covered initial response.The reason was the risk to act on false
alarms, i.e. events that are not triggers specified in the policy.
I6 did not want to allow the client to self-initiate a poten-
tially expensive all expenses paid initial response. At the time
of the final verification, however, I6 had started to offer first
response incident management as an optional service de-
pending on the client’s maturity, in particular with regard to
having a well-established in-house IT incident management
function. Other companies take similar steps to mitigate the
risk of false alarms. For example, I8 emphasizes that the in-
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cident response service is not a general helpdesk, but only
covers the triggers specified in the policy.
4.3. Market composition
All informants agree that the Swedish market for cyber insur-
ance still is small, but also that it has grown quickly in the past
18 months (i.e. from spring 2015 until fall 2016) and that it is
expected to grow more in the future. Compared to the other
Nordic countries, Sweden and Denmark are typically as-
sessed to be the more mature markets in terms of cyber
insurance adoption, with Finland somewhere in the middle and
Norway somewhat trailing.
Cyber insurance in Sweden is currently mostly bought by
relatively large companies, or by smaller companies with ex-
posure to the US market where cyber insurance is often
regarded as a hygiene factor, i.e. a sine qua non for doing busi-
ness. This is reflected in the customer turnover column of
Table 1. According to the informants, there are two main reasons
for the dominance of larger customers. First, as pointed out
by II1, large companies are often the customers of large global
insurance companies, who have ventured into the cyber in-
surance market. Smaller companies are more often customers
of smaller domestic or regional insurance companies that may
not offer cyber products (this is the case of I10). Not being able
to procure cyber insurance from one’s regular insurance
company should raise the threshold for buying cyber insur-
ance. Second, larger companies are accustomed to
commissioning insurance intermediaries, who are a key actor
and almost always facilitate the sales of cyber insurance. In-
termediaries can also have a contractual obligation to keep their
customers informed about emerging threats and emerging in-
surance products, meaning that smaller companies without
commissioned intermediaries will not be exposed to the idea
of cyber insurance products as early as larger ones. (While the
insurance companies often emphasize the role of the inter-
mediary in sales, some intermediaries also point to other
factors. II2 maintains that cyber insurance sales are very in-
cident driven, i.e. that companies react to incidents happening
to themselves and news stories of incidents happening to
others. According to II2, cyber insurance is more difficult to
manage for the intermediaries compared to other kinds of in-
surance, due to the complicated underwriting process. See also
the discussion in Section 4.5).
Looking at the customer turnover column of Table 1, it is
also evident that I1 has a different customer base compared
to the rest. I1 has relatively many customers, but also rela-
tively small ones, as measured by their turnover and indemnity
limits. The only competitor to I1 in the small business segment
is I8, which at the time of the interview was just launching its
cyber insurance product.Thus, I8 did not give any actual number
of customers, but stated its aims for customers with a mere
5 MSEK in turnover.
4.4. Pricing, premiums and competition
As seen in Table 1, the number of claims handled by the in-
surance companies is very low: the typical insurance provider
handles zero, or at most a handful of claims in Sweden annually.
As a result, pricing is more based on expert models than
on historical data, though every informant aims to move in a
more data-driven direction. Typically, pricing and price differ-
entiation is based on the following factors:
• Company size/turnover
• Indemnity limits, deductibles
• Industry, as a proxy for risk exposure
• Market exposure to others jurisdictions (especially the US)
• Assessment of IT and information security maturity, based
on forms, interviews, IT audits etc.
Many informants mention that they, as long-standing in-
ternational players in cyber insurance, have substantial amounts
of historical claims data. For example, I2 has data since 1995
and I4 has 20 years of data. However, while all the big insur-
ance companies have many years’ worth of historical data, this
has limited relevance and applicability to a customer in a par-
ticular industry in a particular (non-US) country in the particular
kind of IT environment of today. Thus, I2 admits that its data
are not very fine grained in terms of countries or industries,
and I3 remarks that claims data in the cyber area are some-
thing that everyone wants, but no one really has, at least not
as much as they want. I5 confesses to being outside the comfort
zone when it comes to pricing, because there is not enough
data to build an accurate statistics-based model. I5 attributes
the variability in premiums seen on the market to this fun-
damental uncertainty – no one knows the right price. I6 agrees
that there is not enough data to create a pricing model based
on historical claims data – a decade or so is not enough. I6 also
highlights the differences between markets. For example, the
deductibles on the US market can be of the same size as the
indemnity limits in Europe, so applying US data in the Swedish
or broader European context is not reasonable. I7 agrees that
even though the company has proprietary data on claims from
the US and the UK, it is difficult to translate that to the cir-
cumstances on the Nordic market. Cyber claims at I7 are treated
as catastrophic events that happen maybe once per hundred
years, not like everyday events where detailed actuarial models
can be built. Only now is I7 starting to be able to compare pro-
spective customers to similar existing ones in terms of being
in the same industry, of the same size, and in the same geo-
graphical location. I9 also tells the same story: Pricing is
currently not actuarial in the sense that it is based on histori-
cal claims data – the number of claims is far too small.
However, I6 and I9 also remark that in the future, pricing
will probably become more based on historical data, as markets
grow and laws become more harmonized across jurisdic-
tions. Thus, in the longer run, market prices will probably
converge.
This lack of actuarial, statistics-based, pricing is a cause for
concern for re-insurance companies. RE1 perceives that many
products are based on historical data that may be irrelevant
in two ways: (i) being based on simple DDoS and script kiddie
attacks, and (ii) being based on US data breach notification laws.
For customers facing more advanced threats in other juris-
dictions, there is no way to know if the pricing is right. RE2
adds that pricing probably is more based on rules of thumb
like industry than on the individual risk profiles of the cus-
tomers, and that proper understanding of risk aggregation poses
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a significant challenge when it comes to cyber insurance prod-
ucts. The price convergence scenario suggested by I6 and I9
can also be contrasted with a more sinister scenario that RE1
warns for: that a large and unforeseen event (a “cyber 9–11”)
causes a backlash for the entire cyber insurance market, sud-
denly making (some kinds of) cyber risks very difficult to insure
on the market.
As outlined above, the actual premiums paid depend on
several factors, such as the size, risk profile, industry etc. of
the insured. Therefore, average or typical premiums for cyber
insurance are useful only as first indications. Nevertheless, the
question was asked, and some characterization of premiums
can be made.
A typical annual premium span is some 5–10 kSEK per MSEK
indemnity limit, i.e. 0.5–1% of the indemnity limit. Some in-
formants give a wider span of 5–15 kSEK per MSEK, some give
figures somewhere in the middle, i.e. 7 or 8 kSEK per MSEK,
some give slightly higher figures like 12 kSEK per MSEK. (For
anonymity reasons, these sensitive figures are not associated
even with the I1–9 pseudonyms.) According to II1, it is pos-
sible to get premiums even below 5 kSEK per MSEK.
There is a common perception that increased competi-
tion has put pressure on premiums. Thus, I3 perceives itself
as more conservative than some competitors that are trying
to get into the market by dumping prices, I5 remarks that com-
petition might in the end turn cyber insurance into a
commodity, and I6 holds that premiums are down a few kSEK
per MSEK compared to a few years ago. I9 agrees that premi-
ums have decreased over the past few years due to competition,
but also predicts that premiums might stabilize or even climb
again in the face of more incidents and claims.
It should be pointed out that there is no necessary contra-
diction in the diverse premium figures given by different
companies. First, there is a perception that prices differ between
insurance companies, so it stands to reason that different in-
surance companies will state different typical premiums.
Second, the number of customers of each insurance company
is so small that outliers (in terms of size, indemnity limits, risk
exposure, etc.) would be expected to lead to different ob-
served average premiums even if everyone was using the same
pricing model.Third, there is a time lag by which some premium
figures might be based on an earlier, less competitive market
situation, while others are based on the present, more com-
petitive market. As remarked by I3, there has been a
considerable increase in competition over the past six months
(i.e. the second and third quarters of 2016), with the number
of companies offering cyber insurance growing from some six
to some ten.
4.5. The underwriting process
The informants all use questionnaires to determine the situ-
ation and maturity of their potential customers. This is also
the basis of the pricing model described in Section 4.4 above.
I1 prima facie appears to be an exception in that such a ques-
tionnaire is only used for higher indemnity limits, but as is
evident from Table 1, a high indemnity limit from the per-
spective of I1 is a low indemnity limit from the perspective of
the other companies.
In addition to self-assessment questionnaires, additional
reports are typically developed in-house by cyber risk engi-
neers, or procured externally from specialized consultancies
such as auditors and IT security consultants, who may perform
e.g. penetration tests. Some informants explicitly let the pro-
cedure depend on the customer, e.g. I3 always conducts
additional interviews and risk assessment by a cyber risk en-
gineer for customers with a turnover above 3 GSEK. Most
informants place a high value on personal interviews with
stakeholders such as CIO, CFO, CEO to assess risks.
As a result, the cyber insurance underwriting process is rela-
tively complicated and takes relatively long time before signing,
compared to other, more standardized insurance products.Thus,
II2 points to the information gathering requirements as a com-
plicating factor from the intermediary perspective. II3
emphasizes that cyber insurance coverage and conditions are
not as standardized as other insurance products: some insur-
ers offer standard policy terms with a broad coverage of cyber
events, others offer a narrower standard package where ad-
ditional protection is optional. Still, informants generally agree
that intermediaries play an important role in the underwrit-
ing process.
One factor that drives the complexity of the underwriting
process is that cyber insurance is not a bulk product, but is
highly tailored to each customer, as is also evident from the
coverage discussion in Section 4.1. Another complication is that
clients are first time buyers of cyber insurance. In other words,
cyber risks are a kind of business risk that has not previously
been quantified by the insured. Doing so, and determining how
much of it to transfer by buying insurance, is quite difficult for
companies as a first-time exercise. On a future, more mature,
market where insurance providers have begun losing cyber in-
surance customers to each other, underwriting might become
less complicated.
4.6. Business interruption
An important aspect of the coverage of lost revenue from busi-
ness interruption is the waiting period applied. A waiting period
is a mechanism similar to a deductible, but based on time rather
than money. Under a policy with a waiting period, compen-
sation for lost revenue from business interruption is only paid
when the duration of the business interruption exceeds the
waiting period.
The shortest waiting periods offered by the insurance com-
panies interviewed are 6 hours (I2, I5, I7, I9) or 8 hours (I3, I4,
I8). However, just like deductibles, waiting periods are tai-
lored as a matter of pricing and negotiation, and most actual
policies sold have significantly longer waiting periods than these
minimums, such as 24, 36, 48, or 72 hours. Though uncom-
mon, it is also possible to negotiate shorter waiting periods –
II1 reports that they have brokered a contract with a waiting
period as short as 2 hours, however only applicable to outages
causing losses over a threshold amount.
The compensation paid for a business interruption that
exceeds the waiting period is calculated according to stan-
dard accounting and auditing principles, similar to how lost
revenue from fires, floods etc. are calculated under a regular
property insurance policy. However, as pointed out by II3, the
details of these calculations still differ between insurance com-
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panies, particularly the period of historical data (e.g. a quarter,
a year or several years) that is eligible when determining the
amount of lost revenue.
One way to assess the impact of business interruptions is
to build models based on Mean Time to Failure and Mean Time
to Restore for customer IT services (or even to use full distri-
butions rather than means). However, the insurance companies
typically do not build such models of IT service availability. I2
sometimes buys this kind of service from specialized
consultancies. I3 explains that historically, when business in-
terruption was the exclusive realm of property insurance, such
models were built. However, for business interruption as part
of a wider cyber insurance, I3 does not use such models. I4 is
the only company that conducts detailed availability calcula-
tions using MTTF and MTTR in-house, but only on a client by
client basis.
I5, I6, I7, I8 and I9 do not conduct detailed availability cal-
culations of client IT services. I8 remarks that such detailed
modeling would be interesting for very large risks only, thus
implicitly making a cost/benefit analysis of the modeling effort.
II1 remarks that MTTF and MTTR will be different in differ-
ent systems, meaning that such models are difficult to
accurately apply at the enterprise level, which may span hun-
dreds or even thousands of systems.
It is interesting to contrast these findings with the prac-
tices in traditional business interruption insurance. I10, which
does not have any cyber insurance products, is similar to the
other companies in not conducting any detailed availability cal-
culations using MTTF and MTTR – neither for cyber events nor
for traditional events (e.g. fires or floods). The adjustment of
the premium offered to the client is instead industry depen-
dent, thus differentiating e.g. manufacturing from professional
services or transportation. However, one interesting observa-
tion is that the traditional business interruption insurance
offered by I10 does not have an indemnity limit (as all the cyber
insurances do), but rather compensates actual loss all the way
up to the full turnover of the client, with the deduction of a
24-hour waiting period. This is probably due to the small size
of most of I10’s customers.
4.7. Requirements on the insured
If cyber insurance is regarded as a pure financial risk transfer
instrument, it might be thought that insurance companies are
willing to insure any risks, provided that the premium paid is
high enough. However, none of the investigated insurance com-
panies work this way. I2 reports that depending on the outcome
of the customer assessment, sometimes no offering is made,
and sometimes only partial protection is offered. I4 has a
number of “red flags” in the policies, i.e. certain parts of the
policy cannot be offered unless the customer meets certain re-
quirements. For example, a customer without an incident
response process cannot be insured at all. Similarly, I7 explic-
itly says that it is preferred to turn a bad customer down over
accepting risky clients at a higher price. I9 also has some basic
criteria which must be met by the customer to even get an offer,
but this minimum baseline varies with industry and risk
exposure.
If turning customers down is the stick, there is also a carrot
in the form of lower premiums for more secure and less risky
customers. I2 reports that the outcome of the underwriting
process is a list of actions to be taken, allowing the customer
to improve its IT environment in order to get a lower premium.
Similarly, I3 and I4 both use pricing models where improve-
ments in the security parameters lead to lower premiums,
though I4 adds that its pricing model always defines a minimum
price. I5 also rewards improved security with lower premi-
ums, and at least on the US market also offers customers
assistance from so called breach coaches, who demonstrate
exploits and offer help in finding vulnerabilities that should
be mitigated. I6 remarks that customer maturity in terms of
e.g. network segregation, endpoint protection etc. “has a huge
impact on customer premiums”. I9, as part of the underwrit-
ing process, has a dialog with the customer about the road
ahead, including possible future security improvements that
have an impact on insurance premiums.
I1 and I8 differ a bit from this pattern. Both report a greater
reliance on static security guidelines that must be fulfilled by
the customer for the insurance policy to be valid, rather than
thorough individual risk assessment. Both also say that im-
proved security in principle could lead to lower premiums, but
have not actually put this into practice. As remarked by I8, such
practices probably suit bigger clients better. This also seems
to be the best explanation for I1 and I8 breaking the pattern:
they operate (or aim to operate) with smaller customers and
thus offer more of a bulk product.
5. Discussion
In the following, reliability and validity of the findings are first
discussed, followed by some substantive implications of the
results.
5.1. Reliability and validity
The reliability of the findings should be assessed as good. First,
there is virtually no risk of sampling distortion, as the infor-
mants do not represent a sample, but essentially all companies
selling cyber insurance on the Swedish market have been
interviewed.
Second, the iterative measures taken to verify the inter-
view results – collecting informant comments on interview
notes, at a seminar, and on the manuscript – should have elimi-
nated most inaccuracies and misunderstandings from the data
collection.
Third, the high degree of unanimity among the infor-
mants about the basic characteristics of the Swedish cyber
insurance market suggests that the results are reliable in the
sense that they would not change much if, somehow, an ad-
ditional informant company were interviewed. This could be
contrasted to a hypothetical low-reliability situation where only
I1 and one of the other primary informants had been inter-
viewed, resulting in lack of unanimity among informants.
As for validity, the situation is a bit more complicated. The
main threat to validity is inherent in the method chosen. The
interview situation allows informants to answer in ways that
– consciously or unconsciously – distort the facts. In particu-
lar, the numerical answers elicited may be subject to well-
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known psychological biases and heuristics (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1975). For example, informants may exhibit an avail-
ability bias e.g. by equating a “typical” indemnity limit or
premium with that of the first customer that comes to mind,
regardless of its representativeness. They may also exhibit an-
choring e.g. by being influenced by a recently stated figure of
customer turnover when assessing an indemnity limit. An-
choring effects in particular cannot be disregarded, as the author
sometimes gave examples of responses from other infor-
mants in order to gain trust in the interview situation, especially
to obtain the sensitive information about premiums. Results
should be interpreted with some caution in the light of this.
Nevertheless, it should also be remembered that the infor-
mants are experts in the field of cyber insurance, who earn their
living working with these figures. In the light of the previous
lack of numerical figures in the literature, the findings of Section
4 should still be regarded as progress.
To some extent, these threats to validity are also miti-
gated by the use of the secondary informants. Since re-
insurance companies and insurance intermediaries are
knowledgeable about cyber insurance, but not biased or partial
in the same ways as the insurance companies, the inclusion
of their perspectives and the relative unanimity of these with
those of the primary informants strengthens validity.
To further strengthen validity, additional data collection using
different methods would be needed. Perhaps most obvious is
a demand side investigation, using buyers of cyber insurance
as informants. This remains future work.
5.2. Generalization to markets beyond Sweden
Connected to issue of validity is the possibility to generalize
the results to other markets, beyond Sweden.This question can
be asked in several consecutive versions.
First, generalization to the Nordic region is relatively straight-
forward. None of the cyber insurances investigated is sold in
Sweden only, and most of the informants do underwriting in
the entire region. This is also evident from the comments on
market composition, where informants often spontaneously
contrasted Sweden with the other Nordic countries, as seen
in Section 4.3. In terms of Table 1, everything but the number
of customers and claims in Sweden should be valid in the whole
Nordic region.
Second, generalization to other countries that are mature
in IT in general, but where the cyber insurance market is still
growing fast, is also possible. In these cases, the numerical
figures cannot be transferred, but qualitative features such as
the dynamics of the interplay between global and regional in-
surance companies probably still hold true.
Third, generalization to cyber insurance anywhere in the
world should be made with more caution. As noted above, I6
highlights the differences between markets, e.g. that deductibles
and indemnity limits can vary by orders of magnitude, so sim-
plistic generalizations are discouraged. However, since I2, I3,
I4, I5, I6, I7, and I9 are all global companies, many aspects of
the coverage and incident first response services they offer, the
underwriting process they follow, the waiting periods they apply,
and the requirements they pose on the insured should be true
in all markets, i.e. substantial information about product of-
ferings anywhere in the world can be inferred from this study.
Clearly, though, the effects of different jurisdictions are im-
portant to consider here.
5.3. Market segmentation
Based on the findings reported in Sections 4.3 and 4.5, there
seems to exist a market niche not yet fully occupied for more
standardized cyber insurance, using a simpler underwriting
process, and aiming at small and medium sized enterprises.
Currently, only I1 and to some extent I8 occupy this niche in
Sweden. Indeed, the fact that I8 launched their cyber insur-
ance product during the interview period provides some
evidence that this niche is now increasingly being filled, as does
a comment from II1 that the underwriting process is increas-
ingly being segmented, with background checks ranging from
simple evaluation forms to exhaustive IT audits.
5.4. Pricing
In line with the literature (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2009; ENISA,
2016; Shetty et al., 2010; Wheeler et al., 2015), the findings re-
ported in Section 4.4 suggest that accurate pricing of cyber
insurance is very difficult and that in practice, it is based on
expert models rather than on historical data.
An actuarially fair premium means that the cost of an insur-
ance policy is precisely its expected value. On an idealized
theoretical market where (i) competition drives the profit of
insurance companies to zero, and (ii) the probability of losses
is not affected by customer behavior, full insurance for losses
will be sold at market prices corresponding to actuarially fair
premiums (Varian, 1992). In other words, if the probability of
losing 1 MSEK a given year is 1%, the annual insurance premium
would be 10 kSEK.
Real markets, of course, do not correspond to this neat
model. First, competition is not perfect, and insurance com-
panies do make profits. Second, the probability of losses is
affected by customer behavior, and thus insurance policies
contain deductibles, waiting periods, and various proactive ac-
tivities to limit risk.
Nevertheless, the mechanism of competition is real, and ac-
cording to all informants, it is driving premiums down. On the
ideal market, competition would never drive premiums below
the actuarially fair premium, because the probability of loss
is known, and insurance companies would knowingly incur ex-
pected losses by such pricing. However, on the Swedish cyber
insurance market, the probability of loss is not known, because
there is not enough historical data of the right kind to esti-
mate it accurately.
The theoretical concept of the actuarially fair premium is
useful in that the concerns of some informants can now be
phrased more clearly: RE1 and RE2 are worried that market
prices might be below the actuarially fair premium. Thus, in
the longer run, insurance companies would incur losses, even
though they have not done so in the short period lived through
so far. RE1 worries that the correction (a “cyber 9–11”) would
be akin to any pricing bubble bursting, impeding the function-
ing of the market in the aftermath. The prediction of I9 that
premiums might stabilize or even climb again in the face of
more incidents and claims can be interpreted as a more mod-
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erate worry that current market prices might be below the
actuarially fair premium. Finally, as I6 and I9 remark that future
pricing based on historical data will probably cause market
prices to converge, this means that the market will have a better
understanding of what the actuarially fair premium is.
Contrary to the concerns of RE1 and RE2, II1 argues that
current market prices are well above actuarially fair premi-
ums. This argument is backed up by statistics on cyber
insurance, covering 2013–2016, from the Lloyd’s Market Asso-
ciation, showing gross loss ratios, i.e. ratios of paid and
outstanding claims to premiums, that are comfortably below
70%. (Note that gross loss ratios correspond to gross margins
– to assess the net profits of insurance companies, all operat-
ing costs must also be accounted for. Thus, actuarially fair
premiums would correspond to net loss ratios of 100%, i.e. no
profit made.) However, as discussed in Section 4.4, a few years’
worth of statistics is not enough to be considered conclusive
evidence.
Finally, it should be noted that the concerns recapitulated
above correspond to the interests of the respective infor-
mants. The re-insurers worry that premiums are too low, so
that they will incur losses. The insurance intermediaries worry
that premiums are too high, so that their clients will pay too
much. Pricing is a notoriously difficult area, and the findings
reported here in no way settle the question of how current pre-
miums relate to actuarially fair prices. It does, however, shed
some light on the current practices of pricing, including their
limitations.
5.5. Business continuity and waiting periods
From the perspective of business continuity, the waiting periods
applied in cyber insurance policies are interesting to discuss.
For decades, it has been acknowledged that even short IT service
outages can have significant impacts (IBM Global Services, 1998),
and more recent practitioner reports estimate average hourly
costs of downtime for large companies in the hundreds of thou-
sands of US dollars (Rapoza, 2014).The availability of IT services
is often characterized by the number of “nines”, i.e. 99.9% avail-
ability is three nines, 99.99% is four nines, etc. Service level
agreements with three nines or better are very common. Some
argue that enterprises typically require four nines or more
(Durkee, 2010). Three nines correspond to just below 9 hours
of downtime for all outages in a 24-7 operating year (even less
if scheduled downtime and maintenance are subtracted from
the operating year). Still, the waiting periods found in the stan-
dard cyber insurance policies are never shorter than 6 or 8 hours
for a single outage (though these are negotiable), and often in
practice one or several days. Thus, waiting periods prima facie
appear very long compared to many IT service outages, in-
cluding severe ones that receive much media coverage.
To give a concrete example, Fig. 1 illustrates the cumula-
tive distribution functions for the time to recovery of 1876
incidents, corresponding to 672,272 minutes, or just over 11,000
hours of downtime recorded from January 2009 to May 2011
at a large Nordic bank (Franke et al., 2014). The diagram illus-
trates the durations of these IT service outages on a logarithmic
scale.The five different distributions shown correspond to chan-
nels, a business side categorization of IT services into categories
such as automated teller machines (ATMs), Internet banking,
credit card payments, etc. Of course, it is not certain that all
IT service outages are similarly distributed, but Fig. 1 is from
one of the few examples in the scientific literature where IT
outage distributions have been investigated empirically, and
it also happens to be an example from the geographical area
investigated here.
Approximately superimposed onto Fig. 1 are two waiting
periods: 6 hours (the very minimum found on the Swedish cyber
insurance market), and 24 hours (a more typical waiting period).
As clearly seen in the diagram, only a tiny fraction of outages
last long enough to exceed a typical 24 hours waiting period.
At first, it might seem counterintuitive that waiting periods
disqualify some 95–99% of IT service outages. However, insur-
ance is typically not about managing small everyday risks, but
rather about managing large but uncommon risks, that might
be very expensive if they occur.Thus, it makes sense, both from
the perspective of the insurance company and the insured, that
a large number of mundane outages are indeed managed in-
ternally by the insured, without any need to involve the
insurance company for doing loss adjustment. The example
is instructive: the data in the diagram correspond to some two
incidents per day in the period studied. Clearly, involving the
insurance company should only happen for a fraction of those.
However, it might also be the case that different custom-
ers in different market segments have different preferences.
For example, the bank in the example has a competent in-
house IT department that manages IT service outages on a daily
basis, and it thus makes sense to have a long waiting period
and self-insure the short outages. For a smaller enterprise that
does not have the same in-house capacity, it might make sense
to pay a higher premium to have a shorter waiting period. On
the other hand, another small company might have its entire
IT outsourced, and so not need to bother with in-house outage
management at all. It remains to be seen if increasing market
segmentation with more offers tailored to smaller customers
Fig. 1 – Cumulative distribution functions for the time to
recovery of 1876 incidents at a large Nordic bank (Franke
et al., 2014) with waiting periods approximately
superimposed.
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(as discussed in Section 5.3) will also have an impact on waiting
periods. In addition, it should be noted that the first re-
sponse services included in cyber insurances are offered to all
customers, and are activated immediately, not being subject
to waiting periods.
5.6. Cyber insurance, risk management, and asymmetry
of information
In the field of risk management, responses to risks are often
classified by the fourfold categorization of (i) avoid, (ii) trans-
fer, (iii) mitigate, and (iv) accept (Hillson, 2002). In this paradigm,
insurance is the archetypal example of risk transfer. There-
fore, it is interesting to note that the cyber insurance products
studied are not pure mechanisms of risk transfer.
Two features are noteworthy: First is the fact that incident
first response services are not only included in cyber insur-
ance packages, but actually central to customers, as related in
Section 4.2. Customers “want to know whom to call when in-
cidents occur”, as noted by I2. Such risk response services add
aspects of accept (incidents will occur) and mitigate (a well-
managed incident will have less severe consequences) to the
basic transfer mechanism of the insurance.
Second is the fact that insurance companies pose infor-
mation and IT security requirements on their customers, and
use pricing and underwriting to nudge customers in a more
secure direction. This adds aspects of avoid (with better prac-
tices, some incidents will not occur) and mitigate (with better
practices, consequences are less severe). Furthermore, the extent
of transfer is rationed, in that customers that are too imma-
ture or have too poor security are turned down.
It is worth commenting on the fact that cyber insurance is
not available on the market for those customers perceived to
be the riskiest.This is expected on a standard insurance market,
where asymmetry of information may destroy the market: if in-
surance policies for high risk customers were offered, they
would be very expensive, and thus attract only customers who
perceive themselves to be at very high risk. This principle is
illustrated in Fig. 2 (a), where the high risk customers are ac-
tually even more risky than observed by the insurer. When risk
is not fully observable to the insurance company, such adverse
selection can be dealt with by introducing a maximum cover-
age offered, refusing coverage for the most risky clients (Akerlof,
1970; Anderson and Moore, 2006).
However, this standard explanation of why prices do not
just rise to match risks is not as convincing on the Swedish
cyber insurance market as on insurance markets in general,
because on this market, the risks are thoroughly evaluated as
part of the underwriting process (as related in Section 4.5). In
Akerlof’s classic example of asymmetric quality information,
the market for used cars, supply and demand become zero
because quality is known only to the seller, but not the buyer.
Thorough and competent inspection of the car would allevi-
ate this. The effect is illustrated in Fig. 2 (b), where thorough
underwriting improves the observability of customer risk. Here,
the insurer’s risk observations of high risk customers are, on
average, correct. Thorough underwriting would thus prima facie
be expected to lead to the insurability also of high risk
customers.
Then again, insurance companies may not believe that their
thorough underwriting leads to the situation depicted in Fig. 2
(b), and they may be correct. First, it may be that there is re-
sidual asymmetric information, even after the underwriting
process, so that although some risks are known and under-
stood by the insurance company, other residual risks are still
known and understood by the customer only. Then adverse se-
lection would still occur, as illustrated in Fig. 3 (a), and refusing
coverage to the riskiest customers still makes sense. This is
Fig. 2 – Sketches illustrating asymmetric information and adverse selection. There is an actual probability distribution p for
an insured party to suffer loss L, but the insurer only knows the observed distribution π. The more accurately the observed
risk matches the actual, the closer any sold policy * will be to the 45° line.
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surely true to some extent. Second, it may be that there is a
large residual symmetric lack of information about the risk level,
even after the underwriting process, i.e. both parties know
equally much, but uncertainty is still large. This is illustrated
in Fig. 3 (b), where the number of high risk customers over-
and underpriced is the same (no adverse selection), but ob-
servations are still not very accurate. This is certainly the case
in some instances. For example, I5 is explicit in having as a
strategy not to assume too much risk, even though building
volume – making sure to have enough customers that risk is
meaningfully spread among them – would be a different strat-
egy to manage the risk of the customer portfolio.
A more practical perspective, as noted by I2, is that insur-
ers work in a similar way to fund managers at banks, deciding
what type of companies are wanted in the portfolio and then
trying to manage and evaluate these as thoroughly as pos-
sible, within a set risk appetite that determines who is desirable
to insure. I4 similarly presented a rank ordering of industries
in terms of risk (retail being the best, pornography the worst).
From this perspective, underwriting and risk management is
not the abstract exercise in economics illustrated above, but
rather an evolving enterprise with several contributing control
mechanisms, not all of which are necessarily captured by Figs. 2
and 3.
6. Summary and conclusions
The results reported in this article offer an interesting picture
of the cyber insurance market in Sweden. Market offerings are
quite similar in covering both 1st party costs e.g. from busi-
ness interruption, and 3rd party liabilities e.g. from data
breaches. However, there are important discrepancies in the
coverage of non-malicious events, the extent to which events
at sub-contractors/service providers are covered, and the cov-
erage for subsidiaries and corporate entities in different
jurisdictions. The cyber insurance policies offered are not pure
instruments of risk transfer, but typically also contain first re-
sponse incident management, which is an important sales
driver.
The Swedish cyber insurance market is rapidly growing,
but cyber insurance in Sweden is currently mostly bought by
large companies. This reflects a market segmentation where
the standard products come with a complicated underwrit-
ing process tailoring offers to large customers, but some
niche players are increasingly offering simpler policies aimed
at smaller customers. Accurate pricing of cyber insurance is
difficult and is based on expert models rather than on
historical data. Lack of actuarial pricing is a cause for concern,
at least among re-insurers who fear that pricing is wrong. In
the long run, there is a belief among market actors that
prices will become more accurate and converge, but there is
some disagreement on whether this correction will mean
lower or higher premiums, and whether it will be benign or a
bubble bursting. Anyhow, increased competition has put
pressure on premiums on the Swedish market. As a rough
indication, the typical annual premium span is some 5–10
kSEK per MSEK indemnity limit, i.e. 0.5–1% of the indemnity
limit.
Waiting periods when business interruption occurs are long
(6–8–24–36–48–72 hours) compared to many outages.This prob-
ably reflects the principle that insurance is about managing
large but uncommon risks, rather than small and mundane
ones. However, preferences for waiting periods may vary over
different customer segments.
Insurance companies are not willing to insure customers
that are too immature or have too poor security.To some extent,
this can be understood from standard reasoning about adverse
selection, but particularities to the cyber market also make for
Fig. 3 – Sketches illustrating asymmetric information and adverse selection.
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additional complications. Insurance companies impose infor-
mation and IT security requirements on their customers, and
insurance pricing and underwriting nudge customers in a more
secure direction, though practices vary between insurance
companies.
While the study is limited to the Swedish market, the results
are of broader interest, as some aspects can be generalized to
the global arena. While absolute numbers such as deductibles,
indemnity limits, number of customers and number of claims
cannot be transferred from the Swedish setting, many impor-
tant qualitative features can be expected to apply worldwide.
This includes the dynamics of the interplay between global and
regional insurance companies in other countries that are mature
in IT in general, but where the cyber insurance market is still
growing fast. It also includes coverage and incident first re-
sponse services, underwriting processes, waiting periods, and
requirements posed on the insured, at the very least with
respect to I2, I3, I4, I5, I6, I7, and I9, which are all global
companies.
Though the picture summarized above is interesting, it is
by no means complete. A few avenues for future work
suggest themselves. First, an obvious road ahead is to comple-
ment the supply-side investigation reported here with a
similar demand-side one, i.e. to conduct a study with cyber
insurance customers. Such a study could corroborate find-
ings regarding e.g. premiums, underwriting, and security
requirements imposed, as well as answer new questions
regarding e.g. insurance as part of wider risk management
practices, rationales for procuring cyber insurance, and the
role of the insurance intermediary. A second interesting
undertaking would be to combine the mathematical cyber
insurance models found in the literature with findings from
qualitative empirical research such as that reported in the
article. A third area concerns cyber insurance decision-
making and the preferences of decision-makers. This could
be studied e.g. with an experimental economics approach, as
has previously been applied to availability service level agree-
ments (Franke and Buschle, 2016). A fourth area deals with
different markets and would include more detailed investiga-
tions of how cyber insurance markets are (i) similar and (ii)
different across different countries.
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